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SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT
LABOR ARBITRATION
PIERRE R. LOISEAUXt
Congressional passage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act 1n 1935 was a vital policy decision. Designed to prevent interrup-
tions of the free flow of commerce by the encouragement of collective
bargaining, this act has had a tremendous effect upon economic or-
ganization and activities, and upon social institutions and attitudes.
The impact of this legislation has not yet been fully realized although
certain immediate results, such as a rise in union memberships and an
effect on strikes and work stoppages, have been carefully observed.,
Other results are slower to manifest themselves and are still somewhat
hazy. The increasing size, wealth, and power of labor organizations
have given rise to problems concerning the relationship of unions to
their members. Congress has not yet placed any direct controls upon
internal union affairs. However, an indication of the approach that
may be taken in future labor legislation is to be found in the reporting
sections of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.2
These sections require that any union, before filing a petition or com-
plaint under the LMRA, have on file with the Secretary of Labor
copies of its constitution and by-laws and a report showing the organi-
zation's complete financial status and operations. This report must
also contain information about membership qualifications and the
means used to authorize certain acts by the organization. The concern
of Congress for the individual worker is also manifested by the lan-
guage of section 7, guaranteeing to employees the right to refrain
from concerted activities, and section 8(b), protecting individuals
from restraint and coercion by unions as well as employers.3
The enactment of the NLRA was, of course, not the first govern-
mental attention to the employee-employer contract; legislatures for
many years had been prescribing certain limits and conditions upon
this relationship.' The NLRA, however, required a legislative-type
contract between management and its employees. The contract re-
t Associate Professor of Law, Lamar School of Law, Emory University.
1. Total union membership increased from approximately 6,100,000 in 1934 to
about 15,000,000 in 1946. See U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
40 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 352 (1935); AMERICAN YEAR BOOK 632 (Schuyler ed.1946). The data on work stoppages and their supposed reasons is carefully col-lected each year and printed in the May issue of the Monthly Labor Review.
2. 61 STAT. 145 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (f )-(h) (1952).
3. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § § 157, 158(b) (1), (5) (1952).4. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Dodd, From
Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of Regulation of Employ-
ment Contracts, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 643 (1943).
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quired is not one of employment, but rather a code of regulations and
rules to govern future conduct when a contract of employment is made
with an individual. True, there were many collective contracts prior
to this act, but this was not the pattern of industrial organization
before the catalytic effect of the NLRA.
This legislation fostered the growth of labor organizations by pro-
tecting employees in their right to organize without interference.
However, the primary goal was to remove possible obstructions to in-
terstate commerce caused by work stoppages. It was believed that this
could be done by establishing a working system of collective bargain-
ing. In order to make collective bargaining work, Congress imposed
upon the employer the duty to bargain with the representative of his
employees. This duty was not to be satisfied by mere mechanical
compliance.- This was a duty to bargain in good faith, and, particu-
larly in the period from 1935 to 1947, it was virtually a duty to make
a contract.6 The present act also imposes the duty to bargain in good
faith but then states that "such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion. . . .',7 Good faith is a subjective state of mind which can be
ascertained only by objective manifestations. In the bargaining situa-
tion these objective manifestations are the substantive proposals made
by the parties. Thus, although making a concession is not required,
an inflexible position would be evidence of bad faith. In view of the
policy of the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining, the appropri-
ate administrative agency or court found, in effect, that anything
short of making a contract was a refusal to bargain. Almost any
reason for not entering into a contract was evidence of bad faith and
constituted a refusal to bargain. The refusal, once it was found to
violate the federal legislation, was only to be cured by executing a
collective labor contract.
Twenty years later, in a different political and economic climate, it
is easy to overlook the hypothesis that this initial contractual relation
between management and labor was governmentally imposed. It could
be argued that, even in the absence of the NLRA, industry and labor
would have eventually entered into a continuing contractual relation-
ship; but it cannot be denied that the relationship was in most in-
dustries imposed by federal legislative policy.
When Congress imposed the contractual relation between labor and
5. Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939); In the Matter of
Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1939); Matter of Houde Engineering
Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 35 (1934) ; see Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain"
Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941).
6. See SPENCER, THn NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (1935); Ward, Tho
Mechanics of Collective Bargaining, 53 HARv. L. REv. 754 (1940); cf. H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (11) (1947).
7. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
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management it provided machinery to protect concerted activities and
to insure a free choice of representatives. Congress also created ma-
chinery to establish the contractual relation, but Congress did not
foresee the need for any contractual remedies. Twenty years ago it
was reasonable not to be concerned with the enforcement and admin-
istration of the contract once entered into. At the conclusion of World
War II, however, this problem had become somewhat more pressing.
Certain sections of the Taft-Hartley Act were addressed to the en-
forcement of contractual provisions in the labor-management agree-
ment, The nature of these amendments and their phrasing indicates
that Congress supposed that the reasons for a lack of litigation be-
tween parties to the industrial relationship were to be found in pro-
cedural difficulties and insufficient amounts in controversy.
One of the most important effects of the NLRA as amended by the
LMRA is the growth of voluntary arbitration. Because the collective
contract is governmentally imposed and because voluntary arbitration
is a logical outgrowth of a continuing contractual relationship, unless
there are available and feasible alternatives, the imposition of the
collective contract has as a long term effect the development of labor
arbitration to solve disputes otherwise unprovided for.
II
What remedies are available when a collectively bargained contract
is breached?
The most accessible remedy is self-help. When a disagreement about
the meaning or application of the contract arises the fastest action is
simply to withdraw from the relation and then, as necessary, invoke
all the weapons in the arsenal of economic warfare. The power to
withdraw exists even though such action breaches a no-strike, no-
lockout pledge. The withdrawal itself is not usually illegal, but almost
any other economic pressure may be illegal from time to time in one
or another jurisdiction. Some industries are considered so vital to our
safety and welfare that it is unlikely that withdrawal would be per-
mitted for any length of time; but when any industry affects inter-
state commerce, this right to withdraw cannot be regulated by the
states because of our present national legislation on the subject,
The purpose of work stoppages and other economic pressures is to
force the other party to his knees so that he will concede. But a settle-
ment reached through self-help is not based upon reason and is about
as logical as settling commercial contract claims by battle or ordeal.
8. ;1 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)-(e) (1952). Justice Frankfurter
discusses the legislative history of these sections in Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 441-49 (1955).
9. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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Economic warfare, like political warfare, leaves deep and lasting
scars. Though no monuments are erected, economic warfare creates
stone-like attitudes which are a serious detriment to further compul-
sory contractual relations.
Using self-help to settle a dispute is not only immature but it is also
inefficient. A decision made in this way usually takes months and
may take years. It puts both parties to the industrial relationship at
an economic disadvantage in their business or domestic communities.
After a hard fought economic battle, both sides are under greater
pressure in future disputes because they must either recoup their
losses or protect the advantage gained.
The important disadvantage is that the problem at hand is not
always settled. As in other types of warfare, the economic battle does
not erase the cause of the original dispute.
Despite these disadvantages, economic warfare is resorted to with
some frequency. Furthermore, some persons of learning and experi-
ence in the industrial field are convinced that economic warfare is
necessary. As stated by the editors of a current labor law text, "The
use of economic pressure is an inherent part of any free collective
bargaining system."' 0 However that may be, all differences in the
labor-management relationship are not and could not be settled in
this primitive manner. Only a very small fraction of the total number
of labor-management disputes are settled by self-help.
In addition to being impractical, self-help when used by "big"
business and "big" labor may not be left to the choice of the parties
involved. Outright prohibition of economic warfare is not made ex-
cept in the case of government employees,1 but there are certain re-
strictions and procedural requirements which have been imposed upon
employers and unions covered by the LMRA.- The clear implication
of section 210 is that, after these restrictions have been removed and
after the procedural requirements have been met, the Congress will
step into the dispute to protect national health and safety. Although
the Supreme Court disapproved of the methods used in an attempt to
settle the 1952 steel strike, the end sought could be reached legally by
other means.13
If self-help is inappropriate, what other remedy is available to the
parties?
A second remedy which is used to a limited extent is litigation,
i.e., resort to the formal judicial process. This way of settling a dis-
pute is far superior to self-help. When controversies arising out of a
10. LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 564 (Mathews ed. 1953).
11. 61 STAT. 160 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 188 (1952).
12. 61 STAT. 142, 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (d), 176-80 (1952).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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collectively bargained contract are taken to the court, it determines
procedurally formalized issues by a traditional reason. The result will
in most cases solve the problem with some degree of satisfaction. This
method, however, is not without its difficulties and disadvantages.
Historically, the courts have had great difficulty deciding which estab-
lished pattern of rules or principles applied to this legislative-type
contract. 4 This document has been treated as a mere statement of
policy, as an agency situation, and as a contract for the benefit of
third parties2 Each of these was an ill-fitting garment for this con-
tract, and eventually the courts recognized the document as an ordi-
nary contract between the employer and his employees collectively.
Even the recognition of this agreement as a contract has not solved
all of the difficulties because the principles of contract, evolved from
hundreds of years of commercial dealings, are not easily applied to a
contract which is primarily legislative in nature and only partly
commercial.
In addition to substantive problems there were many procedural
problems to be overcome. The establishment of the right to sue and be
sued and provisions for service of process led to problems of enforce-
ability and collection of judgments and orders. Many of these prob-
lems of procedure have been settled in the states 5 and in 1947 Con-
gress provided a solution to the procedural questions for the federal
courts by the enactment of section 301 of the LMRAW
Is Iitigation now an efficient and workable method to solve contract
disputes that arise between a labor organization and an employer?
Apparently there are other disadvantages which prevent a flood of
litigation in the courts. The time consumed between service of process
and final decision in legal actions is of great importance to the parties.
The collective bargain arises from a continuing relationship, and the
agreement in question will be rewritten in most cases within two
years? The decision is needed promptly, but unfortunately in both
state and federal courts parties may make time a factor by using many
dubious but legal means to lengthen the period between commence-
ment (of a case and its final disposition.
Litigation is expensive. And one side may intentionally increase ex-
penses for the other, The procurement of evidence may be expensive,
14. gee Rree. Colteefive Labor Agreementg in Anerican Law, 44 HAyR. L. REv.572 (1931); Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 YA= L. 195(1938)15, See Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concopt of Contract, 48CoLrr-M. L, REv, 829 (1948).
16 See, ixq., CAL. Cona Cm. PRoc. S 388 (195$): Micn. STAT. ANN. § 27.664(1938) : MlNx. STAT. ANN. § 540.152 (West Sup 1954).17. Q1 STAT. 156 (1947),29 U.$C. § 185 (1952).
18. Tn applving the contract-bar rules the NLRB deems two years the proper
or usual Period for a contract, absent special circumstances. 19 N.L.R.B. ANN.
REP. 24 (1054).
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printing and reproduction costs are high, and qualified professional
services are a cost factor, particularly in extended litigation. An-
other cost, not as readily apparent, is loss of production time by both
employees and management. Often a number of witnesses must be
available for lengthy periods of time because it is impossible to tell
when a particular matter will be argued or whether testimony will be
needed at all.
Another factor which weighs heavily against the use of litigation
is that there are only limited remedies available. A damage suit may
answer the need in some cases, but in the industrial relationship there
are many situations in which an award of damages would not solve
the problem. Many times merely the construction of a clause in the
agreement is needed and the damages, if any, are retrospective only.
Declaratory judgments may be available in some jurisdictions,"0 but
many declaratory judgment acts have been so tightly construed that
for the purpose of settling disputes arising out of a collectively bar-
gained contract they have been rendered practically useless.20 Equity
actions, when available, are also severely hedged in by historical de-
velopment and a lack of flexibility in remedy. In short, our present
legal system is not designed or prepared to handle problems arising
out of a legislative-type contract which acts prospectively rather than
retrospectively. The best evidence of the inefficiency of courts in this
area is the lack of use.
Some countries have recognized the inadequacies of traditional
judicial machinery and have incorporated labor courts as a regular
part of their judicial system.21 To date this country has elected not
to go any farther than to create administrative agencies to handle the
preliminary steps in the formation of this vital industrial relationship.
III
Is there another method to settle industrial controversies growing
out of the collective contract?
A brief survey of practices and current literature indicates that
there is another method which is used extensively to the apparent
satisfaction of the parties. When self-help and formal litigation have
both been found to be inappropriate, the parties to the relation have
set up a consensual method of disposing of differences. This method,
usually referred to under the general term "arbitration," involves
submitting the problem to a third person or persons for disposition.
19. See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS 492 (2d ed. 1941).
20. See Note, Declaratory Judgment and Matured Causes of Action, 53 CoLmM.
L. REV. 1130 (1953).
21. Handsaker, Labor Courts in Germany, 8 ARMB. J. (n.s.) 131 (1953); Lenhoff,
Some Basic Features of American and European Labor Law: A Comparison, 26
NOTRE DAME LAW. 389 (1951); WUNDERLICH, GERMAN LABOR COURTS (1946).
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Voluntary arbitration arises normally out of a contractual relation-
ship. Two persons in controversy may submit their disagreement to a
third person for settlement, but this is not usually done after the
disagreement arises. In most instances the parties agree that if any
dispute arises out of a subsequent contractual relation, it shall, if not
settled by preliminary procedures, be submitted to arbitration. Ad hoc
arbitration to settle a dispute between persons not previously in some
contractual relationship exists, but arbitration has had its greatest
use and growth in areas where there is an existing contractual re-
lationship.
Over three hundred years ago Hobbes observed that men in con-
troversy must either arbitrate, come to blows, or leave the matter
undecided.' = Actually, arbitration is as old as the Bible.23 Through
the years, however, it has changed its setting from time to time. In-
ternational commercial arbitration is probably the oldest formalized
arbitration, but internal commercial arbitration followed very closely.
The most recent area of expansion is in the field of labor.2 4
Labor arbitration was not widely accepted until the early forties,
but this should not overshadow a long and admirable background in
certain industries. A contract between the Knights of Labor and the
shoe factories of Portsmouth, Ohio, signed March 11, 1886, provided
a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration which would not be
out of place in any contemporary collectively bargained contract. This
agreement provided that after the three steps of the grievance pro-
cedure were exhausted without settlement each party was to select an
arbitrator and that these arbitrators would in turn select a third,
"whose decision in the matter shall be final and binding. ' '25 Arbitra-
tion provisions were not infrequently found in labor agreements
throughout the last half of the nineteenth century.2 6 Probably the
oldest continuous provision for arbitration is that found in the full-
fashioned hosiery industry. This long and successful arbitration
experience dates back to 1886.
Arbitration in the labor field has had its greatest success in those
areas of our economy where collective bargaining is well established.
One of the underlying reasons for this concurrent development is
found in an aspect of arbitration usually referred to as "face saving."
When parties in the labor-management relationship are compelled to
use force or to resort to litigation they find themselves required to
22. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 26 (Blackwell's ed. 1946).
23. 1 KINaS 3: 16-28.
24, ELKOUIm, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (1952); Taylor, The Arbitration of
Labor Dinpute, 1 ARB. J. (n.s.) 409 (1946).
25, Deser, Early Labor Grievarce-Arbitration Agreement, 2 ARB. J. (n.s.)
253, 254 (1947).
26. See Oliver, Thze Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 206, 213(1934).
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take a public stand on issues which must be oversimplified. For public
.consumption it is necessary to take a position either for or against
a particular demand, whereas most issues are complex with various
factors weighing on either side. A later public retraction from such
position is difficult and embarrassing, for in situations of economic
warfare or litigation one party must "win" and the other must "lose."
On the other hand, in the normal arbitration hearing, public vindica-
tion is not a factor. It is not necessary for the parties to simplify and
condense their positions into "either-or" arguments for general con-
sumption. Parties in arbitration may concede, shift, or change their
position without the necessity of concern for the outward appearance.
The agreement to arbitrate is in itself a consensual arrangement that
is conducive to a problem-solving attitude rather than the sometimes
violent attitudes that are engendered in the presence of economic force
or formal litigation.
During recent years the use of arbitration has greatly increased in
its quantitative incidence so that today it has become a tremendous
force working toward the maintenance of industrial peace. Arbitra-
tion as a way of life in American industry has contributed greatly to
the economic miracles we have all witnessed in recent years.
However, this method of settling disputes in industry has been
opposed by both labor and capital. It was early thought, and argued
at length, that the intervention of a third person in the collective bar-
gaining relationship was a surrender of vital rights by both parties.
This argument has a superficial reasonableness, but experience and
analysis have found the argument wanting in substance. In voluntary
arbitration the parties are free to control the submission of the con-
troversy and to have decided only that issue which they have agreed
shall be decided. The arbitrator is engaged to make a decision that the
parties themselves cannot make. In making this decision he does not
act as an indifferent unguided machine. By their agreement to arbi-
trate the parties have established a certain framework within which
the arbitrator must function. In addition to the parties' consent to
submit differences to a qualified third party whose selection is gov-
erned by the same basic provision, the individual questions are usually
framed by consent and embodied in the "submission." By this sub-
mission the parties retain complete control over the framework in
which the decision-maker operates. Thus, between the contractual
provisions providing for arbitration and the submission agreement in
a given controversy, the arbitrator is usually given a narrow area in
which to exercise his judgment. Add to this the factual material that
is selected exclusively by the parties to present to the decision-maker,
and it is difficult :to understand how the parties have surrendered
vital 'rights. The alternatives--self-help and litigation-involve a
'58
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complete forfeiture of consensual control. It may be argued that the
above consensual analysis is not applicable to day-by-day industrial
controversies. However, the fact that the consensual submission is
made in loose and general language, or not made at all, does not negate
the right which rests with the parties to specify and limit the basic
framework within which the decision is to be made.
The importance of arbitration in our present industrial system as a
method for settling disputes is revealed in the subject matter of these
disputes and in an examination of the extent of the arbitrator's
authority.
In a discussion of the subject matter of labor arbitration, "new
contract" disputes must be separated from disputes involving griev-
ances under existing agreements. New contract arbitration is de-
signed to settle the terms of a contract to be entered into by the par-
ties. Grievance arbitration determines the application and interpreta-
tion of an existent contract. In new contract arbitration the subject
is submitted ad hoc in each case. Such arbitration may call for a de-
termination of any issue falling within the broad limits of that area
in which collective bargaining is legally required. Here the submission
agreement is all-important as there is no existing contract setting
limits for the arbitrator. Both labor and management feel that new
contract arbitration should not be used as a substitute for collective
bargaining, but only to avoid costly resort to economic warfare. But
it is just at the point of drastic economic sanctions that contract arbi-
tration has its greatest utility and importance.
Professors Warren and Bernstein sent questionnaires to over five
hundred corporations, unions, and arbitrators seeking to find the
present status of thought on contract arbitration. The results, which
indicated vast differences of opinion within each of these groups, were
summarized as follows:
These clashing viewpoints and the complexities of contract arbi-
tration provoked extensive comment. Even those who approve
leave no doubt that they wish it used only rarely. As one arbi-
trator observes, "In most cases contracts should be collectively
bargained and a better contract is arrived at in that event." Sev-
eral, accordingly, suggest confining contract arbitration to indus-
tries directly affecting the public. An arbitrator proposes it for
wage reopening cases. "If the parties agree in advance to arbi-
trate all contract disputes," an eastern arbitrator warns, "they
may find themselves 'stuck' with permanent arbitration that will
operate . . . as compulsory arbitration. The experience of the
street railway industry under this form of arbitration has not
been too happy. -2 7
27. Warren & Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 200, 203 (1951).
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Professor Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania, former chairman
of the War Labor Board and of the Wage Stabilization Board, asks the
question whether new contract arbitration can be used more fully in
resolving industrial disputes and makes this prediction:
There is no doubt that it can be and will be if labor and manage-
ment take seriously their obligation to resort to strikes and lock-
outs only after making every reasonable effort to settle their dis-
putes by peaceful means. The full utilization of this kind of
voluntary arbitration depends, in large measure, upon the ability
and the willingness of labor and management to give concentrated
and intelligent attention to the stipulation to arbitrate as an
important labor relations document. The challenge is so to de-
velop that instrument that arbitration proceedings can be under-
taken with a minimum of risk to both parties and retention in
their hands of control over the process. Voluntary arbitration
does offer a way to minimize loss of employment and interrup-
tions of production, and its possibilities need full exploration in
the quest for industrial peace."'
Although contract arbitration has not reached the acceptance that
has been accorded to grievance arbitration, it probably will be used
increasingly in the future as a rational method of avoiding economic
waste. The parties face certain dangers in its use; but if this type
of arbitration is used with special attention paid to the scope of the
problem to be decided, the risks are small when weighed against the
only other known alternative-self-help. And in certain basic in-
dustries, the self-help alternative may not be permitted when it en-
dangers the health and safety of our society.
Turning to grievance arbitration, i.e., that arbitration which inter-
prets the terms of the contract, there is a much different picture. In
this area virtually no dissent from the principle of arbitration is
found. There are, however, differences concerning the subject matter
and the scope of the arbitrator's authority. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics found that about 89 per cent of the collectively bargained
contracts in effect in 1952 contained a provision for arbitration of
those grievances not settled by the preliminary steps in the proce-
dure.2 9
In grievance arbitration one important conflict exists between those
who feel that all differences between labor and management should
be arbitrated under a general arbitration provision and those who feel
that only matters arising out of an interpretation of the contract
28. Taylor, 'The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 1 ARB. J. (n.s. 409, 414(1946); see Braden, Arbitration and Arbitration Provisions, in NEW YORK UNI-
VERSITY SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 355 (1949).
29. MOORE & NIX, ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, 1952,
at 261 (U.S. BUREAu or LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, 76 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
1953).
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should be brought before the arbitrator or umpire. Speaking at
Columbia University, John A. Lapp made this observation:
Most labor contracts extend arbitration to all grievances, com-
plaints or disputes arising either from the terms of the written
document or otherwise. Some contracts limit arbitration to inter-
pretations while others exclude specified subjects from arbitra-
tion. Two of the obvious exclusions in all contracts are that the
terms of the contract cannot be altered by an arbitration award,
and that an award cannot violate a law or take away a right
under a law.'0
In summarizing its findings, the Bureau of Labor Statistics-had
this to say about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator:
A special analysis of one-third of the arbitration provisions in
effect in 1952 was made to determine what matters were within
the scope of arbitration. Eighty-two percent of these clauses
provided for arbitration of disputes over the interpretation and
application of the agreement. This basic area was restricted in
some agreements by specific exclusion of certain subjects from
arbitration even though they were included in the agreement.
Among the issues sometimes excluded were grievances relating to
management rights, union membership, production standards,
rates on new or changed jobs, and health, welfare, and pension
benefits.
The scope of arbitration was stated in very general terms in the
remaining 18 percent of the agreements which were specially
analyzed. In this category were such clauses as "any grievances,
disputes, or controversies between the parties" and "all disputes
and grievances which arise over this agreement as well as those
on matters not specifically covered by this agreement." Under
such general clauses, arbitrable issues might include disputes over
interests as well as rights. '
Professors Warren and Bernstein-- found the basic question in
grievance arbitration to be whether anything beyond the terms of
the contract can be submitted to arbitration. Their sampling showed
that management has more reservations about the subject matter of
this type of arbitration than either arbitrators or unions. All three
groups quizzed had some reservations.
In our contemporary industrial relations scene, arbitration of griev-
ances is the rule. A consensual form of industrial government is now
operating. The collectively bargained contract stands as a legislative
enactment governing future conduct which is administered by man-
agement and reviewed under grievance procedures culminating in
informal judicial review by voluntary arbitration. The clause pro-
viding for this latter step normally states that arbitration shall be
30. Lapp, Grievance Arbitration Under Collective Agreements, 5 ARB. J. (n.s.)
109 (1950).
31. MooRE & NIX, supra note 29, at 264.
32. See note 27 supra.
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restricted to matters arising from interpretation of the contract and
its application. Instances in which arbitration is unavailable when
cases are not settled by the grievance procedure are indeed rare. Such
a restriction sometimes grows out of a fear that the impartial third
party will not have the necessary understanding of the complex sub-
ject matter.33 The answer to this is to be found within the framework
of the arbitration procedure itself. Each party has ample opportunity
to educate the arbitrator in the necessary technical problems involved
in the case. In the usual arbitration proceeding the parties have the
opportunity to present facts unhampered by the technical rules of
evidence and they have occasion to argue both orally and by memo-
randum. With these opportunities the argument that the arbitrator
will be technically unable to determine the proper result is hardly
tenable.
Distinct from problems of subject matter, in grievance arbitration
there is an additional problem of determining what authority is to be
given to the arbitrator in relation to the disposition of a case. Thus,
an arbitrator may have a submission which merely asks, "What dis-
position is to be made of this grievance?" On the other extreme, he
may have a contractual prohibition which prevents him from deciding
anything but an issue of good faith and from answering in any man-
ner except "yes" or "no."
The usual contract provides that the complaint unsettled at the final
step of the grievance procedure "shall be subject to arbitration."
Occasionally another provision of the contract will provide some
standards for the arbitrator to use in making his decision.34 The
parties are required to make a stipulation at the hearing which will
state with some particularity what issues are to be decided. When the
parties are acting in good faith, the stipulation is worded so that a
final disposition of the matter may result from the impending hearing.
In some circumstances the parties cannot agree to a stipulation that
will dispose of the matter; in other circumstances the terms of the
existing contract make the form mandatory. This is illustrated by
33. Sometimes contracts limit the arbitrator to matters not involving technical
knowledge and in such cases a specialist is required to decide technical matters.
"Should the matter to be arbitrated involve job assignments or work loads, then
said list shall be composed of qualified textile technicians." Contract, Spartan
Mills and UTWA (AFL) § 3 (1952). "If in the opinion of the Company or the
Union, the matter to be arbitrated is of such nature as to require the services of
a technician, the arbiter shall avail himself of the technical services of the South
Carolina Department of Labor or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
Any technician so secured must be an impartial, qualified and trained expert in
Industrial Engineering and acceptable to both the Union and the Company." Con-
tract, Pacific Mills and TWUA (CIO) § 6 (b) (1952). See also Contract, Crown
Cotton Mills and TWUA (CIO) § 4(f) (1951).
34. See U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LiABoR, BULL. No. 908-16,
CoEzycurvE BARGAINING PROVISIONS: GRIEvANcE AND ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 87-
96 (1950).
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promotions under so-called job posting systems. The union files a
grievance on behalf of some member or individual claiming that the
seniority provision of the contract has been violated. In such a case,
if the arbitrator is asked a yes or no question about the propriety of
the company's action, a negative answer will not dispose of the diffi-
culty for the company can then award the promotion to another, not
the individual in the first case. A grievance could then be filed upon
the basis of this action. If, however, the arbitrator is asked which of
two or three persons should have been given the job under the con-
tract provision, there can be no further dispute arising out of that
same job vacancy.
It is wise for the parties to limit the arbitrator to an interpretation
of the contract and its application. But to provide for arbitration and
then limit the arbitrator severely by the terms of the contract or the
submission would seem to be an indication of either a basic distrust
of the institution of arbitration or a misunderstanding of its nature
and usefulness. Occasionally, initial proceedings under arbitration
clauses result in a bad experience which causes parties to be arbitra-
tion-shy for long periods.
IV
The present status of voluntary arbitration in terms of the use,
subject matter, and extent of the authority granted to the arbitrator
shows that labor arbitration is not only the best de facto alternative
to self-help or litigation, but it is a very efficient and practical means
to settle labor-management controversies. Two further alternatives
have been selected in other countries to dispose of similar labor dis-
putes. The labor courts of France, Germany, and the Scandinavian
countries have been referred to previously. Australia and New Zea-
land have found it expedient to use an involuntary arbitration sys-
tem. ' Neither of these alternatives has been widely suggested in this
country, although the latter has been offered in watered-down forms
in several instances.2 In the extreme national emergency created by
World War II, the War Labor Board acted in part as a labor court and
imposed what amounted to involuntary arbitration in certain cir-
cumstances27
There are five possible ways to solve a dispute arising from a col-
lectively bargained relationship: self-help, litigation, voluntary arbi-
tration, involuntary arbitration, and the use of special governmentally
3 -,. See the discussion of this in MATHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 288
(1953).
36. Frev, The Loq7ie of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12 LAW & CoN-
TEmp. PRoB. 264, 272 (1947); Richberg, Case for Restriction of Strikes by, Law,
LAB, REL~. REP. (19 L.R.R.M. 143) (Address, Amecrican Bar Association, October
29, 1946); SLIcHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 164 (1947).
37. See Freidin & Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58
HARV. L. REv. 309 (1945).
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created labor courts. Other ways may exist or be devised, but these
are the principal methods used in the world today. The first two
methods, which are used to some extent, are not adequate at present to
solve the existing controversies. The third is used extensively in con-
tract administration and to a limited but growing extent in new con-
tract disputes. The last two are not considered appropriate for our
present form of social, economic, and political organization. Although
there are many hotly argued problems growing out of existing volun-
tary arbitration systems, they are working well as a whole. An as-
sumption might be made that we have solved the problems arising
out of the making and administration of labor-management agree-
ments by a smooth-working system of voluntary arbitration. How-
ever, legal institutions, like other established ways, are in a constant
state of flux. It is necessary when considering decision-making proc-
esses to be alert for signs of change which may be of growing impor-
tance.
There are signs of change in the institution of voluntary labor
arbitration. First is the frequency and economic importance of arbi-
tration compared with other forms of decision making in labor dis-
putes. Arbitration has been expanding in both use and importance at
a tremendous rate, particularly since the termination of World War II.
More persons and economic business units are being affected by arbi-
tration awards every month. An institution with such wide applica-
tion cannot escape careful scrutiny on behalf of those persons immedi-
ately concerned and, ultimately, on behalf of the body public. Aside
from growth, there are at least two other trends that are of concern.
The first is the increasing deference paid to the arbitration process by
the courts. In deciding cases under section 301 of the LMRA, the
federal courts have stated that if there is an arbitration provision in
the contract which covers the controversy at hand, the parties must
exhaust their remedies under that contractual provision before they
can pursue the remedy provided by the act.35 A number of state arbi-
tration acts which have been construed to exclude disputes growing
out of collectively bargained contracts 9 have been amended in recent
years to specifically include labor matters.40 Many states have enacted
compulsory arbitration statutes applicable to public utilities. Without
further discussion these developments may be added to the lengthening
38. See Katz'& Jaffe, Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses by Section 801,
Taft-Hatley Act, 8 ARB. J. (n.s.) 80 (1953).
39. See Comment, State Arbitration Statutes Applicable to Labor Disputes, 19
No. L. Rnv. 280 (1954); Syme, Arbitrability of Labor Disputes, 5 RUTGERS L.
REV. 455, 458 (1951)
40. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 475, § 1 (1938),.amended by R.I. GEN. AOTs c. 3517(1955); OHio SENATE BMLL 327 (1955).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/8
LABOR ARBITRATION
list of instances of judicial and legislative cognizance of the arbitral
method of settling labor disputes.
Probably the most important instance of the increasing attention
being paid to arbitration is the recently proposed Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, which was approved in August 1955 by the Conference of
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and by the American Bar Asso-
ciation. In twenty-five clearly written sections the proposed uniform
act provides for the validity of arbitration agreements in the labor
field (the act is not restricted to labor controversies) and for specific
performance of such agreements and the corollary of enjoining litiga-
tion pending arbitration. It is provided that each party has the right
to be represented by an attorney and that the arbitrator shall have the
right to use the subpoena and to take depositions. An award in writing
is mandatory, and the act provides a procedure for a rehearing within
a set number of days. A rather extensive judicial review is established
which includes the power in the reviewing court to order a rehearing
by the same or different arbitrators. An award may be vacated when
the arbitrator exceeds his authority or when he renders an award
contrary to public policy. The act then provides that an appeal may
be taken from any disposition made by the initial reviewing court
except from an order to arbitrate.
One important aspect of this proposed uniform law is that it does
not affect in any way the consensual element in the original agreement
to arbitrate. However, after the initial determination to arbitrate is
made by the parties there is a formalization of procedures and rights,
and an extensive legal procedural framework for review.
V
Because of the increasing breadth and importance of labor arbitra-
tion and because of the changes which are taking place in this institu-
tion, the following questions are of increasing significance.
How does this evolution affect the parties? How will these changes
affect the arbitrator? What interest, if any, does the public have in
this institution and the rights affected thereby?
The parties are interested primarily in efficient settlement of dis-
putes. Do they have an equally important long-range interest in the
direction that the cumulative changes take? Ai-e the changes, ever
occurring in this institution, tending to move voluntary arbitration
nearer to one of the other alternative means of settling labor-manage-
ment differences? What of those controversies which may not be
settled by self-help because of public health, safety, and welfare?
What of the individual whose rights are adjusted, enforced, or lost
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by this means? Is his position enhanced or endangered by the chang-
ing nature of voluntary arbitration?41
What of the arbitrator? Does increasing legal recognition of this
institution and formalization of it affect his original status as a private
employee of the parties? Does this man or board of men have any
responsibility beyond the settlement of the immediate controversy?
Will this man become a "professional" or a specialist to an increasing
extent?
Do these persons concerned with the immediate disposition of an
arbitration case have a duty beyond economic self-interest? If they
have such a duty, what is its nature and to whom is it owed ?42 Is it
socially desirable to have the ever-increasing costs of this dispute
settlement allocated solely between the parties in the present manner
or should the public bear a part of the cost as in formal judicial litiga-
tion? What of the substantive law of industrial relations as developed
by arbitrators? Will present trends in arbitration force it into rela-
tively rigid common-law patterns or will it continue to grow as a
body of customary law? If allowed to crystallize will this body of in-
dustrial law fail to respond to rapid economic change? What, if any-
thing, is to be done in the instances where other means of settlement
are now used?
If voluntary arbitration is the solution best suited to our present
socio-economic organization, it is important that these questions be
answered in terms of current changes.
The existing private government of the industrial community will
be allowed to continue within public government only so long as the
private goals and achievements are not in conflict with national policy.
41. See Jaffe, Labor Arbitration and the Individual Worker, 287 ANNALS 34
(1953).
42. See Freidin, The Public Interest in Labor Dispute Settlement, 12 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 367 (1947).
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